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Our presentation reports on the analysis of risk presented 
by carbon fiber utilization in commercial aviation. At the out- 
set, I would like you to note two things. First, although several 
speakers yesterday alluded to the entire civil aviation activity, 
today we are reporting only on one portion of the civil aviation 
activity, namely, commercial aviation. Second, this is a status 
report and some of the things that we will be presenting today may 
change somewhat as our study progresses. As shown in Figure 1, 
we have a three part presentation: Part I - General Concepts 
and Part 2 - Overall Approach, which I'm going to discuss; and 
Part three (which requires a majority of the time allocated to 
us) Risk Evaluation and Perspective, which will be presented by 
Dr. Fiksel. The last part of our presentation, which Dr. Fiksel 
will give, will show national risk profiles for carbon fiber 
usage in commercial aviation. 
THREE PART PRESENTATION 
1. GENERAL CONCEPTS 
2. OVERALL APPROACH TO CARBON 
FIBER COMPOSITE RISK ANALYSIS 
3. RISK EVALUATION AND PERSPECTIVE 
Figure 1 
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General Concepts 
Risk profiles are a very good way of expressing risks, espe- 
cially where complicated mathematical models are involved. They 
express a risk in a relatively easy way and allow decision makers, 
who may not be interested in the detailed modeling, to make 
decisions based on what they see graphically. However, risk pro- 
files can also be misinterpreted just as easily. I want to be 
absolutely certain that our results are not misinterpreted and in 
order to make sure of that, I'm going to take ten minutes to dis- 
cuss certain general concepts. 
Some of you may already be quite familiar with risk analysis 
and the concepts inherent in such analysis and for you this discus- 
sion may be repetitious. However, I think it is worthwhile because 
you will understand and appreciate our output better if you under- 
stand our terminology and objectives. 
Now to begin with, I'd like in Figure 2 to very quickly 
define risk as we have used it in our analysis. Risk is the po- 
tential for realization of unwanted negative consequences of an 
event or an activity. Today, the event or activity of concern to 
us is the use of carbon fiber composites in commercial aircraft. 
The negative consequences, of course, were discussed yesterday. 
The fact that fibers can be released and can cause negative impacts 
GENERALCONCEPTS 
DEFINITION OF RISK 
RISK IS THE POTENTIAL FOR REALIZATION 
OF UNWANTED, NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES 
OF AN EVENT OR ACTIVITY 
Figure 2 
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on electronic equipment is well known. The question must be asked 
"What is the potential for realization or the likelihood of 
occurrence of those negative consequences?" As you can see, risk, 
as we have defined it, has two very definite components. There 
are probabilistic components, which deal with the likelihood of 
occurrence of various events, and deterministic components that 
deal with the actual level of impact that.may be experienced. It 
is very important to keep in mind that "risk", as we use the term 
throughout our presentation, has these two components. It is 
meaningless to talk of risk only in terms of probability of 
occurrence or only in terms of the amount of damage that can occur. 
The two go hand in hand and are inseparable. 
Now, as I'm sure you've gathered from the many presentations 
that were given yesterday, the use of carbon fiber composites in 
commercial aircraft does involve some risks. Where there are some 
risks there is need for an appropriate way of handling those risks 
through risk management as shown in Figure 3. In this particular 
case, the Federal Government is essentially placed in the role of 
being risk manager. A rational way of conducting risk management 
activities is by going through the three-step process shown: of, 
first, identifying the risk (again keep in mind the two components 
of risk); then measuring it quantitatively (it is very important 
to do it quantitatively); and finally by looking at the measured 
value to determine if control strategies are required or not, by 
DEALING WITH RISK THROUGH RISK MANAGEMENT 
RISK IDENTIFICATION 
RISK MEASUREMENT 
RISK CONTROL 
Figure 3 
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comparing the measured risk against other risks and comparing the 
benefits to be derived by the use of the CF material against the 
risks that have been measured. 
I don't think it necessary to spend much time discussing risk 
identification, the first step in the three-step process. Several 
speakers addressed different areas that deal with the risk associ- 
ated with the use of carbon fiber composites in aircraft. There's 
been some past experience. There was an accident of sorts in- 
volving an incinerator. There's been substantial experimentation 
and dissemination testing, with actual burning of composite struc- 
tures to see how much fiber can be liberated under different fire 
conditions, and studies of the effects of burns and explosions, of 
burns alone, and so on. The risk of the problem that we are look- 
ing at today has been pretty well identified in terms of the areas 
identified in Figure 4. There aren't too many unknowns in terms 
of conceptual identification of what can happen, what different 
consequences can result and the probabilistic pathways leading to 
what those consequences might be. In some cases where a certain 
piece of equipment may not have been properly tested, it is use- 
ful to use industrial experience-based judgement, engineering 
judgement, guesses if you will, to try to assess how things are 
going to fail, so their failure can be incorporated within the 
risk analysis. The risk identification step in this risk man- 
agement scheme has, I believe, been quite well completed. 
RISK IDENTIFICATION 
l PAST EXPERIENCE - DIRECT OR RELATED 
l EXPERIMENTATION 
l INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENCE - BASED JUDGEMENT 
Figure 4 
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The next step then is to measure the risk quantitatively as 
described in Figure 5. This requires that we assess the frequency 
RISK MEASUREMENT 
l FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF FAILURE EVENT 
l CONDITIONAL OCCURRENCE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 
. CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT IN TERMS OF TOTAL IMPACT 
Figure 5 
of the occurrence of the failure event of concern. In our case 
this is an accident involving an aircraft that has carbon fiber 
composite structures on it and that is involved in either a fire 
or a fire followed by an explosion. This frequency can be assessed 
by looking at historical data on accidents and operations. Once 
that particular step has been completed, there are several con- 
ditional occurrences of subsequent events which must be examined. 
Given that the fiber is involved in a fire in the aftermath of an 
aircraft accident, what are the chances that it will be released? 
What are the chances that there will be wind blowing from a certain 
direction to carry the fiber a certain way? What are the chances 
that there will be certain classes of industrial facilities in 
its path? And so on. Finally, we need to assess deterministically 
the consequences of the event in terms of total impact. As Dr. 
Credeur pointed out in her presentation, impacts can vary across a 
wide spectrum, depending on your interests. We're not that con- 
cerned about fatalities or environmental damage or chronic health 
problems today; we're more concerned with total dollar loss as a 
result of one of these occurrences. 
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In Figure 6 I'm going to show how the measured risk can be 
displayed. 
Probability of 
Exceeding 
Dollar Damage 
D 
Now this is hypothetical, so please, these numbers 
Comparator Risk Profile A 
(e.g. Damage from Tornadoes) 
Comparator Risk Profile B 
Activity 1 with Risk 
Control Option in Force 
1 \ 
10-S I 
10 = 10 6 10 ' 108 109 
Impact Level D ($1 
Figure 6 
have no bearing on the presentation. I just want to use this for 
demonstration purposes, because I want to point out five or six 
things. First, look at Activity One. Suppose Activity One is an 
activity of concern to us and we evaluate it through our risk 
analysis scheme and we measure the risk. The measured risk would 
be portrayed in a fashion as shown depicting the probability of 
exceeding a certain dollar damage plotted against the dollar dam- 
age. For example, if Activity One had the risk profile as shown 
and you go up to the 10e3 probability (which is about one chance 
in a thousand), you find that the corresponding dollar loss is 
about a million dollars. If on the same risk profile for Activ- 
ity 1, you look at an event that has a probability of occurrence 
of 10-4 (one in ten thousand chance), you see that the loss is 
about ten million dollars and so on. 
Curves such as these are very useful when the probability of 
occurrence can vary over several decades as they usually do in pro- 
blems like this and where the consequence of the impacts can also 
vary over several decades. It is better to show the risks in this 
way then just talk about "expected values," because an "expected 
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value" really hides the fact that you can get.substantially greater 
or lesser losses with different probabilities. We give our numbers 
in "expected values" as well, however. Expected values are useful 
when the degree of variation in both probability and impact are 
small. But when the degree of variation in impact and probability 
get this large, it is not necessarily the best measure of assessing 
the risk we're dealing with. 
You notice I've shown uncertainty bounds, and the uncertainty 
bounds are rather substantial. They can vary by as much as an 
order of magnitude on either side. In risk analysis, we have 
generally found that we are not trying to find estimates within 
an accuracy of a factor of 50% or even a factor of 2. Very often, 
even with substantially greater uncertainties, very useful 
decisions can be made. As you will see later on, when you compare 
that risk profile with the uncertainties against other risk pro- 
files A and B in Figure 6 (comparative profiles might be damage 
from tornadoes, hurricanes, high winds, or snow storms), you might 
find that, in spite of the uncertainties, one profile can lie 
substantially below another. Hence, you would be in a position to 
say that the risk from this activity, in spite of its uncertain- 
ties, is substantially less than the risk from whatever else. You 
might wish to compare it against manmade risks, because, after 
all, this is a manmade risk. It is a risk that man imposes on 
himself. It's not a natural event and you might want to compare 
it with things like transportation of hazardous chemicals, pesti- 
cide programs, nuclear power plants, liquified natural gas 
transportation. 
Now after you've developed the risk profile for the activity 
of concern, if you find that the risk is unacceptable for whatever 
reason, you can go back and ask yourself what caused the risk in 
the area of concern to lie where it does lie. For example, if a 
decision maker finds that one portion of the risk profile is too 
high, he can look at options to reduce the risk. He can go back 
to his calculation to learn what contributed to those points on 
the curve and he can reduce the risk with risk control options. 
He can make that curve swing down with the control strategy by 
either reducing the probability of occurrence or reducing the 
consequences. This can be done by making changes in operations, 
by material modification, 
the systems, 
by engineering fixes or redundancy in 
by better inspections, etc. 
The final thing I want you to note on Figure 6 is the x-axis, 
the impact level D. There are dollars, and there are dollars. 
Now you can talk about the losses caused by lost payroll, you can 
add to that the cost of repairing the equipment, you can add to 
that the business interruption which is very often the largest 
cost, you can add to that legal fees of defending against the 
accident, and so on. So you must understand very carefully what 
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dollars you're talking about when you present a risk profile. 
Somebody might present it only in terms of direct loss incurred. 
Others, who want to explore the problem in more detail, might 
present it in terms of loss and the two can differ greatly for 
the same phenomenon. So keep in mind that the definition of the 
impact dollar D can vary. Note that for this same carbon-fiber 
problem, if one wanted to examine shock hazards and portray the 
shock hazards in terms of expected casualties, it is very easy to 
do so, and we are going to take a look at that in the next phase 
of our work. Today, however, we're only going to present our 
results in terms of national risk profiles with dollar damage as 
the impact parameter of interest. 
I already talked about risk control. Recalling that risk is 
comprised of two elements, there are two ways in which you can 
reduce it, as shown in Figure 7. You can either reduce the pro- 
bability of occurrence through better control systems, or you can 
reduce the level of impact. Which method you choose depends on 
how large the risk and benefits are and what the cost effective- 
ness of the various control strategies is 
RISK CONTROL 
. REDUCE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE 
l REDUCE LEVEL OF IMPACT 
Figure 7 
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Overall Approach 
I briefly want to review the overall approach that we used so 
that you understand how we procedurally went about solving this 
problem. As illustrated in Figure 8, utilizing aviation statis- 
tics, such as the number of accidents that have occurred in the 
t 
RELEASE SCENARIOS 
EXPOSURE DISTANCES 
t 0 I 
WIND 
-I 
ENUMERATE 
I-- 
FIELD WORK AND 
DIRECTIONS EXPOSEDPROPERTY CENSUS DATA 
AVERAGE EXPOSURE LEVELS 
BY EQUIPMENT AND FACILITY 
Figure 8 
last ten years, the accidents that fall in the fire or fire and 
explosion category, and the number of operations, and tying those 
statistics in with airport characteristics (such as the type of 
climate it might have, the number of operations, any unusual fea- 
tures, the runway orientation, and so on), we compute the accident 
probability for aircraft. Out of that would be developed a series 
of accident scenarios which, when tied in with the amount of car- 
bon fiber utilization in aircraft in different years and the fire 
extent and duration that can occur in accidents of different sever- 
ity, would determine the release conditions--how much carbon fiber, 
if any, is released, and in what form. Then, we use that informa- 
tion, along with the prevalent atmospheric condition and the fiber 
properties (which have been reasonably well measured at this time) 
to calculate a dispersion footprint. The accident probability 
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calculation (the top central box in Figure 8) will be addressed in 
some detail, because it was not addressed in much detail in previ- 
ous presentations. The release conditions will not be addressed 
-in too much detail because there has been a lot of discussion on 
the testing that has been done. As far as the disoersion footprint 
calculation is concerned, we use a method very similar to the one 
Dr. Wolf Elber talked .about, so we are not going to spend too much 
time discussing that. Once we get the footprint, we can get expo- 
sure distances out of it; and depending on the wind direction and 
actual field work in areas of interest, we can find and enumerate 
the property that has been exposed. This again was not discussed 
in too much detail yesterday so we will be discussing it today. 
We did look at all the 26 major airports in developing our national 
risk profile. The information obtained then feeds into average 
exposure levels by equipment and facility and, depending on the 
transfer functions in different buildings and different systems 
(which depend on the penetration capabilities of the fibers and 
the systems they encounter), one estimates the direct and indirect 
loss. By tying the accident probability with the total loss, one 
develops a risk profile for this problem. Dr. Fiksel is now going 
to talk about the last item: Risk Evaluation and Perspective. 
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Risk Evaluation and Perspective 
Joseph Fiksel 
I would like to briefly summarize the objectives of our study 
as shown in figure 9. Our overall objective, as Dr. Kalelkar 
explained, was to evaluate the risk to the-nation due to carbon 
fiber releases from commercial air carrier accidents involving 
fires. In order to do this, we gathered data concerning air 
carrier incidents. Our major source of data was the National 
Transportation Safety Board statistics which were discussed ear- 
lier. We gathered data concerning release and dispersion of fib- 
ers, 
Dr. 
including the experimental results which were referred to by 
Vernon Bell in his presentation. We also looked at the poten- 
tial damage to electronic equipment and identified the types of 
equipment that might be vulnerable to carbon fibers. We developed 
methodologies using various techniques including statistical tech- 
niques, engineering models, and also a Monte Carlo simulation tech- 
nique which is really at the heart of our methodology for develop- 
ing a risk profile. Using the data and the methodology that I've 
described, we were then able to estimate the national risk. 
OBJECTIVES OF ADL STUDY 
GATHER DATA CONCERNING 
l Air Carrier Incidents Involving Fire 
l Release and Dispersion of Carbon Fibers 
l Potential Damage to Electronic Equipment 
DEVELOP METHODOLOGY USING 
l Statistical Techniques 
l Engineering Models 
l Monte Carlo Simulation 
ESTIMATE NATIONAL RISK, INCLUDING 
l Projection of CF Market Growth 
l Consideration of Major Airport Cities 
l Identification of Potentially Vulnerable 
Facilities 
Figure 9 
This estimation involved a projection of the growth of the 
carbon fiber market from the present day up to 1993 and considera- 
tion of the major cities around the nation. We identified the 
large hub airports as described by the FAA, and we examined the 
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potential risk to those airports in detail. We also looked at the 
additional airports in a more superficial manner to try to get 
an idea of the total national risk due to all air carrier opera- 
tions in the U.S. Finally, we identified the different kinds of 
vulnerable or potentially vulnerable facilities that could exist. 
Because of the very large exposure distances involved, and because 
a carbon fiber cloud may extend over a very wide area, all 
segments of society and business activity may be influenced by 
this carbon fiber release. 
The projections for utilization of carbon fiber composites in 
commercial aircraft were provided to us by the airframe manufac- 
turers. We also developed our own projections, and we will soon 
be coordinating with the airframe manufacturers in trying to im- 
prove these projections. These projections are preliminary, but 
they give a good idea of the magnitude of carbon fiber masses 
that will be on aircraft in the future. We divided the aircraft 
that might carry carbon fibers into three classes. Since turbo- 
props and propeller aircraft in general will not carry fibers, we 
concentrated on jet aircraft. Three categories were identified: 
small, medium, and jumbo jets. 
On the first line of figure 1.0, the number of aircraft in 
service is projected for both 1985 and 1993 in each of these three 
categories. As shown, the total number of aircraft projected for 
PROJECTED CARBON FIBER UTILIZATION 
SIZE OF JET 
SMALL MEDIUM JUMBO 
YEAR TOTAL 
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT 1985 825 1980 495 3300 
IN SERVICE 1993 950 2280 570 3800 
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT 1985 165 396 163 724 
CARRYING CF 1993 475 1368 285 2128 
CF MASS PER 1985 234 338 1017 
AIRCRAFT (LB,) 1993 1000 1500 4500 
i 
Figure 10 
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1985 is 3,300. By 1993, we expect 3800 aircraft. The fraction of 
these aircraft carrying carbon fibers varies from approximately 
one-quarter of the total fleet in 1985 to half the fleet in 1993. 
Thus, the total fraction of airplanes carrying fibers will in- 
crease. In addition, the amount of carbon fibers per aircraft 
will tend to increase. For example, on the jumbo jets in 1985, 
we expect an average of about a thousand pounds of carbon fiber 
per aircraft: by 1993 this amount is expected to increase to about 
4500 pounds per aircraft. Incidentally, for the risk profile that 
I'm going to show you later, we utilized the 1993 figures. We 
concentrated on the 1993 data since we were attempting to upper 
bound the risk that could be caused by the carbon-fiber release 
phenomenon. It is also possible to generate a 1985 risk profile, 
but we won't present that today. 
The sequence of events that we were obliged to look at in 
studying the carbon-fiber phenomenon is shown in figure 11. Of 
course, to get a feeling for the frequency of occurrence of the 
failure event, we had to look at the total number of air carrier 
operations and project these out to 1993. Once an air carrier 
operation occurs, there is a certain chance of an aircraft 
accident. Therefore, we identified the accident statistics 
corresponding to the kinds of accidents that we were concerned 
with, namely those with fire and/or an explosion. In the after- 
math of an accident involving an aircraft which carries carbon 
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TO BE MODELLED 
Air Carrier 
Operation 
Aircraft Carbon Fibers 
Accident Released and 
with Fire Dispersed 
and/or Over Large 
Explosion Area 
Carbon Fibers 
Penetrate 
Buildings 
Housing 
Electronic 
Equipment 
Carbon Fibers 
Cause Equipment 
Failure and 
Result in 
Economic 
Losses 
Figure 11 
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fibers, there is a possibility of the fibers being released and 
dispersing over a large area. This has already been discussed to 
a great extent by previous speakers. The fibers can penetrate 
buildings and damage electronic equipment. This damage can result 
in economic losses. N,ow , we'll go through each of these steps 
in turn and I'll try to summarize some of the results that we've 
obtained in looking at the different aspects of this release 
phenomenon. 
The first event is the air carrier operation. If you look at 
figure 12, we have two circle charts. The one on the left indi- 
cates the percent of traffic which takes place at the major 
airports around the nation. As I mentioned, we concentrated on the 
large hub airports. According to the 1977 FM statistics, there 
are approximately 26 such large hub airports, accounting for 
almost 70% of the total traffic. These large hub airports would 
therefore account for the majority of the risks. We also looked 
at the medium and small hub airports to a lesser extent, but our 
simulation concentrated on these 26 large hub airports. The 
circle chart on the right shows the national fleet mix projected 
for 1993 for the three types of jet air carrier operations. The 
national fleet mix was adjusted for individual airports since 
each airport has a slightly different fleet mix. 
DOMESTIC JET AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS 
Other, 
Small Hub 
Airports 
40 Medium Hub 
Airports 
26 Large 
Hub Ai t-ports 
Percent-of Passenger Enplanements 
FT Conventional Jet 
Jumbo Jet 
Small Jet 
National Operations Mix 
(Varies by Airport) 
Source: 1977 Airport Activity Statistics - FAA, CAB 
Figure 12 
212 
Figure 13 shows results from an extensive analysis of the 
National Transportation Safety Board data base using both the NTSB 
tapes and the hard copy records for that subset of the accidents 
that involved a fire. The data base contains approximately 260 
accidents involving either total destruction of the aircraft or 
substantial damage. Total destruction means that the plane is 
essentially nonrecoverable. This chart shows the relative fre- 
quency of total destruction and substantial damage in the dif- 
ferent phases of operation: takeoff, landing, cruise, and 
static/taxi. The largest potential for total destruction, which 
is generally the type of accident that involves the largest fires, 
occurred in the case of landing accidents, but there were also 
significant possibilities of total destruction in the other 
phases. 
DOMEST,C AIR CARR,ER INCIDENTS WITH FIRE AND/OR EXPLOSfON 
NATIONAL FAEOUENCY - 6.7 per 10 Million Operations 
- about 5 per Year 
m Subatanrial Damage 
Landing Cruise 
Phase of Operation 
Static. Taxi 
Source: NTSB Accident/Incident Statistics, 1969.1976 
Figure 13 
Weather conditions at the time of an accident are generally 
classified into IFR - which stands for Instrument Flight Rules - 
and VFR - which stands for Visual Flight Rules. There is also a 
Below-Minimum classification. We took the IFR and Below-Minimum 
statistics for accidents and compared those against the accidents 
which occurred during VFR weather. We learned that an accident 
is eight times more likely in IFR or below-minimum weather. 
Accordingly, we normalized the national accident frequency (about 
6.7 accidents per 10 million operations involving a fire and/or 
explosion and total or substantial damage, which is equivalent 
213 
to about 5 accidents per year) by the IFR/VFR weather frequency 
in each of the major airports to obtain an adjusted accident rate 
for each of these airports. 
In addition, we estimated the occurrence of explosions in 
these accidents. Explosions are relatively rare; only about 8% 
of all accidents with fire result in some kind of explosion. 
However, it is not a true explosion. Rather, after a period of 
burn the fire may reach the fuel tanks, at which point there is 
a very rapid burning or deflagration of the fuel in the fuel 
tanks, similar to an explosion. This deflagration or "explosion" 
can cause an agitation of the structure, promoting the release of 
a large number of fibers. In his presentation, Dr. Vernon Bell 
showed some of the experimental results that we used to estimate 
fiber release. Based on these results, we estimated the fraction 
of fibers that were released from an aircraft. These fractions 
ranged from approximately 5% in the case of substantial damage 
accidents to as much as 25% in the case of a total destruction 
accident with an explosion. 
Because of the two situations under which carbon fibers can 
be released, we used two different models, as shown in figure 14, 
to account for the release phenomenon. The first model was an 
instantaneous release model, corresponding to the explosion case. 
In this model, we assumed an instantaneous release of a certain 
mass of carbon fibers corresponding to the mass that was onboard 
DISPERSION MODELS 
Aircraft 
-_-- Inversion her -_-------- 
--A\ 
1. Fire followed by a delayed explosion 
(instantaneous release model) 
2. Fire Plume Model 
Figure 14 
214 
the aircraft. A certain percentage of this mass was then assumed 
to be released as single fibers. The resulting carbon fiber 
cloud then drifted downwind. The other type of model, in the case 
where no explosion occurred, is the fire plume model, where the 
fire causes a plume which rises and reaches a certain maximum 
height. The carbon fibers are then dispersed downwind. The 
plume, however, is tilted due to the settling velocity of the 
fibers. I won't go into the details of these dispersion models, 
since Dr. Elber gave a very thorough discussion, but these models 
are similar to the ones that he described and they have been veri- 
fied in different experimental situations. 
Our accident-statistics investigation also permitted us to 
calculate a probability distribution for the location of an acci- 
dent and to describe the proportion of the accidents that fell 
within various distances of the runway. We found that the 
fraction of accidents that occur off the airport was fairly large 
in the case of landing accidents, as much as 45%. With most 
other operational phases, the proportion of accidents occurring 
off the airport was smaller. In the case of off-airport acci- 
dents, as illustrated in Figure 15, we established distributions 
for the distance and the angle from the runway, and we also 
utilized runway orientations to pinpoint the location of the 
accident within the vicinity of each airport. Once the incident 
location was established, the dispersion model was used to 
EXPOSURE FOOTPRINTS AFTER CF RELEASE 
Aircraft 
Runway 
Wind Direction 
Figure 15 
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calculate exposure contours in the downwind direction. I should 
point out that these contours are not drawn to scale. 
Obviously, the aircraft runway is not that large; the contours 
can be up to 50 miles in extent, and, generally speaking, they 
tend to be elongated. That is, they are much longer than they 
are wide, and not elliptical or almost circular as shown in 
Figure 15. 
Figure 16 gives some sample results from the fire plume model 
just to give you an indication of the kind of results that we 
EXPOSURE 
LEVEL 
5 
10 
FIBER-SEC/M3 
103 
FIBER-SEC/M3 
SAMPLE OUTPUT FROM FIRE PLUME MODEL 
Scenario: 500 KG of Carbon Fibers Released Over a lo-Minute Period 
CONTOUR NEUTRAL ATMOSPHERE MODERATELY STABLE ATMOSPHERE 
DIMENSIONS (M.) 4M./SEC. WIND VELOCITY SM./SEC. WIND VELOCITY 
NEAREST DISTANCE 
FARTHEST DISTANCE 
MAXIMUM WIDTH 
AREA (KM*) 
NEAREST DISTANCE 6,300 28,150 
FARTHEST DISTANCE 94,300 63,150 
MAXIMUM WIDTH 16,107 8,363 
AREA (KM*) 1,110 230 
Figure 16 
obtained for the exposure contour. Two different types of atmos- 
pheres are shown: a neutral atmosphere and a moderately stable 
atmosphere. These are two of the Pasquill-Gifford stability 
classes. In the case of the neutral atmosphere we had a four 
meter per second wind velocity; and for the moderately stable 
atmosphere, a two meter per second wind velocity. In both cases, 
500 kilograms of carbon fibers were assumed to be released over a 
10 minute period. The distances shown in figure 16 are in meters 
except for the area which is shown in square kilometers. For 
example, the lo5 exposure contour extended over a distance of 57 
kilometers and had a maximum width of four kilometers, so it was a 
fairly elongated contour. Interestingly, in this case the neutral 
atmos,phere showed no 105 exposure contour. There are cases in 
which the maximum exposure will not necessarily exceed 104 or 105. 
39,150 
57,150 
4,247 
60 
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The 103 contour for the neutral atmosphere was fairly long. It 
went out a distance of 94 kilometers, which is slightly in excess 
of the 50 mile distance that we discussed earlier. 
Given these contours, we can establish the exposure in the 
case Of an accident occurring in the vicinity of an airport. Fig- 
ure 17 gives, as an illustration, a map of Massachusetts showing 
DISTRIBUTION OF SECTORS AROUND LOGAN AIRPORT, BOSTON, MASS. 
Figure 17 
the location of Logan Airport in Boston. We first establish a 
grid, or a map, in polar coordinates surrounding each major 
airport. We then place concentric circles at distances of 5, 10, 
20, 35, and 50 miles from the airport center and divide the 
circles into 8 equal segments. This procedure effectively 
divides the area into 40 sectors. Once the exposure contour is 
determined and the incident location is identified, we can find 
the exposure distribution in each of these forty sectors. Notice 
that if you go out 50 miles, you cover a good half of the state 
of Massachusetts. Therefore, many different communities are 
involved. A number of other, smaller, airports are also covered. 
so, as I mentioned earlier, there are an enormous number of 
facilities which are potentially vulnerable and subject to expo- 
sures of greater than 103 carbon fiber seconds per cubic meter. 
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To establish the kinds of facilities present in exposed 
areas, we did a great deal of work in terms of field surveys as 
well as investigations of census data. As shown in figure 18, we 
POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE FACILITIES 
1. Residences 
2. Manufacturers - Electronic Equipment 
- Computers 
- Aerospace 
3. Transportation - Aircraft and Air Traffic Control 
- Mass Transit 
- Motor Vehicles 
4. Communication -Telephone 
- Radio/TV/Microwave 
- Post Offices 
- Fire/Police 
5. Services - Financial/l nsurance 
- Software/EDP 
-‘Hospitals 
6. General - Retail Outlets 
- Office Buildings 
- Industrial Plants 
Figure 18 
identified the potentially vulnerable facilities in these areas, 
starting with households. We were able to get a count of the 
number of households ineachgeometric sector from 1972 census 
data. We also used the 1972 census data to examine standard in- 
dustrial classifications to determine the number of facilities in 
various types of industries. We enumerated manufacturers of 
electronic equipment which might be sensitive, including 
computers and aerospace manufacturers, and we also looked at 
general manufacturers who might use electronic equipment in 
process control or for other applications. We looked at the 
transportation industry; in particular, aircraft and air traffic 
control were of great interest, and we also examined mass transit 
systems and motor vehicles. We looked at communications in terms 
of telephone, radio, T.V., microwave, Post Offices, and fire and 
police communications. In terms of service industries, we looked 
at finance and insurance industries, software and electronic 
data processing centers as well as hospitals. Finally, in the 
general category, we looked at various types of retail outlets, 
office buildings and industrial plants corresponding to the 
general manufacturing category. Mr. Ansel Butterfield described 
some of the main field surveys that we made. There have been 
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some additional surveys since then; so that we now have a fairly 
good coverage of some of the more important facilities in these 
different categories. As I mentioned, we established a data base 
which essentially describes the number of facilities existing 
in the fifty-mile radius area surrounding each of the 26 major 
airports. I should reiterate that these results are based on 
1972 census data and that we did not attempt to project the 
number of facilities that exist presently into the future. 
Given that the facilities have been identified, suppose 
that a facility is exposed to carbon fibers. How many of these 
fibers enter the building, and what is the effect of exposure 
inside the building? Mr. Israel Taback gave us a good discussion 
of the notion of penetration and transfer functions, so I won't 
go into that in much detail. The model and main variables are 
shown in figure 19. The filter efficiencies, window openings, 
interior dimensions of buildings, ventilation rates, recircula- 
tion of air, and infiltration rates through walls and through 
cracks can all be estimated based upon heating and ventilation 
handbooks and construction codes, so we can get a fairly good 
idea of what the rate of entry is for fibers into a building. 
We can then calculate an inside exposure based upon this infor- 
mation and the outside exposure. 
BUILDING PENETRATION MODEL 
TRANSFER FUNCTION DEPENDS ON 
l Filter Efficiencies 
l Window Openings 
l Interior Dimensions 
l Ventilation Rates 
l Recirculation of Air 
l Infiltration Rate 
Figure 19 
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Figure 20 gives an overview of some of the results we got for 
transfer function, which we call an airborne exposure transfer 
function (AETF). We've shown a range from minimum to maximum. 
The reason that we show a range is that there is some uncertainty 
in the estimation of a transfer function. There are two sources to 
AIRBORNE EXPOSURE TRANSFER FUNCTION 
OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 
AREA DESIGNATION 
AETF Range 
Min. M.SX. 
AIRCRAFT - CABINS, DOORS OPEN 0.16 
- CABINS, DOORS SHUT 0 
- EXTERNAL COMPARTMENTS 10-3 
AIRPORT -BAGGAGE AREAS 7 x 10.2 
- CONTROL TOWERS, WINDOWS SHUT 0 
-PASSENGER TERMINALS 0 
COMPUTER ROOMS 0 
EMERGENCY GENERATORS 0.1 
HEALTH FACILITIES -GENERAL AREAS, NON SEALED 1.5 x 10.’ 
-OPERATING ROOMS 0 
INDUSTRIAL BUILDINGS -OLD BUILDING 0.3 
-MODERN, AVERAGE FILTERS 7 x lo+ 
OFFICE AREAS -WINDOWS SHUT 
RESIDENCES -WINDOWS OPEN 
Figure 20 
4 x 10-4 
lo-2 
0.68 
9 x 10-3 
9 x 10.2 
0.87 
6 x 1O.3 
10.3 
3 x 10-3 
0.7 
0.44 
3 x 10.4 
0.7 
0.13 
7 x 10-z 
0.7 
this uncertainty. One is the fact that each of the variables is 
somewhat uncertain. For example, filter efficiencies do have 
some uncertainty band; they can't be estimated precisely. Another 
source of uncertainty is that in each type of facility there is 
an enormous variation in the different building characteristics, 
from modern buildings to old buildings, from very well controlled 
buildings to poorly ventilated buildings. So within this range 
of variation, we're able to estimate a transfer function range 
from each of the facility categories that I showed earlier. Some 
samples of the ranges we identified are given in Figure 20. You 
can see that they range over many orders of magnitude. We looked 
at aircraft and the airport terminal areas. In computer rooms, 
for example, you have a fairly low transfer function, anywhere 
from zero to about 10D3. For residences the transfer function 
tends to be high, ranging from 10-2 to about 0.7 in a situation 
where it's summer time and all the windows are open. 
Figure 21 gives the failure model for electronic equipment. 
By using this exponential failure distribution and vulnerability 
220 
ELECTRONIC EClUIPMENT FAILURE MODEL 
Probability 
of Failure 
I 
63.2%- - - - 
Exposure E 
-+- Probability of Failure = 1 e 
c = Mean Exposure for Failure 
EXPOSURE PERCENT FAILURES 
F 1100 1 .O% 
E 110 9.5% 
2 63.2% 
10 E 99.9% 
Figure 21 
estimates based upon the experimental data that were described by 
Mr. Israel Taback, we were able to develop a failure distribution 
for each category of equipment that was identified. It's 
interesting to note that, on the horizontal axis, at two decades 
below E, the mean exposure for failure, the probability of 
failure is 0.01; or about 1% of the equipment exposed at that 
level will fail. At one decade below E, about 10% of the 
equipment will fail. At E, about 63% of the equipment will fail. 
However, at one decade above E, nearly all the equipment exposed 
at that level will fail. 
Figure 22 gives some examples of the facility categories that 
we've identified, along with particular types of equipment that 
are present in those facility categories and the mean exposure 
estimates which were derived for those types of equipment. Notice 
that one column is called "Failure Category". In order to esti- 
mate the economic losses, we identified for each type of category 
what the function was for the equipment within that facility. In 
other words, how would the failure of equipment affect the opera- 
tion of the facility as a whole? We identified three such 
classes, namely equipment which would require only repair in the 
case of failure, equipment which might disrupt the operation Of 
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Facility 
Category 
HOUSEHOLDS 
Al RPORT CONTROL 
TOWER 
AIRPORT CONTROL 
TOWER 
SHIPYARDS 
POST OFFICE 
Al RPORT TERMINAL 
MANUFACTURERS 
Al RCRAFT 
RADIO/TV STATION 
RETAIL OUTLETS 
BUSINESS SERVICES 
HOSPITALS 
EDP SERVICES 
SELECTED VULNERABILITY ESTIMATES 
Equipment Failure 
Type Category 
TV/STEREO REPAIR 
ATC CONSOLES REPAIR 
ATC COMPUTER REPAIR 
CRANES REPAIR 
ELECTRONIC SORTERS REPAIR 
CRT DISPLAYS REPAIR 
TELEPHONE PBX DISRUPTIVE 
AVIONICS INSTRUMENTS DISRUPTIVE 
CONTROL ROOM CRITICAL 
POINT OF SALE TERMINAL DISRUPTIVE 
GENERAL OFFICE EQUIP. DISRUPTIVE 
POWER GENERATOR REPAIR 
COMPUTER CRITICAL 
Figure 22 
Mean Exposure 
(Fiber-Sec./M.3) 
6.4 x IO8 
7x IO5 
4.9 x IO9 
4.0 x lo5 
5.0x IO5 
1.6 x IO7 
7.0 x IO5 
1.0 x 106 
3.0 x 105 
1.0 x IO7 
5.0 x 105 
9.8 x IO5 
4.9 x 109 
the facility (called a disruptive failure), and equipment, such as 
a control room in a radio/tv station, where, if the equipment 
fails, the operation is obliged to shut down until the equipment 
can be repaired. This latter is called a "critical failure". 
Shown are two types of critical failure: one for the control 
room and another for the computer in an EDP service industry. 
Notice that the exposure estimates for computers to fail are 
fairly high; they're about 5 times 109. The reason is that our 
vulnerability estimate for computers included a transfer function 
for the computer room. Most facilities have a transfer function 
corresponding to the building exterior, but, since computer rooms 
tend to be very well protected, there is an additional transfer 
function corresponding to the passage of the fibers from outside 
to inside the computer room and also corresponding to the cabinet 
protection of the computer. In general the vulnerability 
estimates tend to range between lo5 to 109 fiber seconds per cubic 
meter. Generally speaking these values are well above the exter- 
nal exposures that we saw from our dispersion analysis, and, due 
to the transfer functions, the inside exposures will usually be 
even further below these levels. 
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Figure 23 gives economic consequences of the carbon-fiber 
problem for industries. 
ies of failure type. 
Recall that we identified three categor- 
Correspondinq to each of these failure 
types, we had a different approach-towards estimating the economic 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR INDUSTRIES 
losses. 
TYPE OF 
FAILURE 
Minor 
Disruptive 
Critical 
DIRECT 
LOSSES 
Equipment Repair or 
Replacement 
Equipment Repair or 
Replacement 
Equipment Repair 
or Replacement 
Figure 23 
INDIRECT 
LOSSES 
Additional 
Operating Costs 
Shutdown, Loss 
of Revenue 
In the case of a minor failure, which amounts to only 
the repair of the equipment, the cost of the failure was assumed 
to be the cost of replacing or repairing the equipment. In the 
case of a disruptive failure we have the equipment repair costs, 
plus the additional operating costs due to alternate procedures 
for operating the facility. Although it was assumed that the 
facility could continue operation while the equipment was being 
repaired, some additional operational procedures would be 
necessary. Finally, in the critical failure we assumed a shut- 
down of the facility, in which case there would be a loss of 
revenue during the estimated downtime for the equipment under 
consideration. To get revenue figures and operating cost figures 
for the various facilities, we used average financial statements 
for an industry based upon each metropolitan area. We were able 
to obtain these average financial statements for areas near each 
of the major airports that we examined. 
We've gone through the sequence of events that was to be 
modeled, and I've shown the approach we've taken towards modeling 
each step in that procedure, from the initial air carrier 
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operation to the potential release of fibers, through the pene- 
tration, to the possible failure of the equipment, and ultimately 
the economic losses that could result. Now what did we do with 
all these data? In her presentation, Dr. Karen Credeur gave 
a good description of the simulation approach that was used. 
Our approach was slightly different, but essentially similar 
in character: it was based upon the roulette wheel analogy that 
Dr. Credeur described. We used each of the data types that were 
generated in each of the steps that I described, and input them to 
a Monte Carlo simulation model, illustrated in figure 24, which 
performs random draws to simulate the occurrence of an accident. 
MONTE CARLOSIMULATION PROCEDURE 
? Denotes a random draw 
Figure 24 
We simulated the occurrence of a large number of accidents for 
each of the major airports under consideration. We input 
frequency distributions for each of the different accident 
characteristics: the aircraft/incident details such as aircraft 
type r operational category, whether the damage was total destruc- 
tion or substantial damage --all these details were derived from 
the aircraft accident statistics. For example, there's a cer- 
tain chance of total destruction, there's a certain chance 
that the destruction will be off-airport, there's a certain 
chance that there will be a fire, and there's a certain chance 
that there will in fact be an explosion following this fire. 
A question mark indicates a situation in which we had a random draw 
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from a frequency distribution. We selected the appropriate 
dispersion model. For example, if there was a delayed explosion, 
we selected the instantaneous release model. The carbon fiber 
release conditions were based upon the aircraft/incident details; 
these described the mass of fibers that were released. The 
weather conditions were drawn from data supplied by the National 
Climatic Service, which describes the wind direction and the 
atmospheric stability classes at each of the airports under 
consideration. Given all these details, we then call upon the 
dispersion model to calculate the exposure contours. The 
accident or incident location tells us where the exposure contours 
originate, and we then determine the exposure by sector for 
each of the 40 sectors surrounding the airport. Once the expo- 
sure distribution has been determined, we look at the 
potentially vulnerable facilities within each of the sectors and 
calculate the total expected economic losses. 
The simulation that I described establishes a distribution 
for the losses given a single accident at a particular airport. 
To develop a national risk profile for a single accident, we 
combined the incident frequencies, as indicated in figure 25. 
Having the national risk profile for a single incident and 
knowing the frequency of incidents in the nation, which as I said 
was approximately 5 per year, we then can calculate two types of 
representations of the total national risk. One representation 
DERIVATION OF NATIONAL RISK PROFILE 
for Individual 
port Risk Profiler 
Y-l National Risk Profile for a Single Incident c I 
L i National 
Annual 
LOSS 
Frequency 
Figure 25 
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is the national annual loss frequency, which tells us how often 
events occur with various levels of damage. For example, how 
often would a ten thousand dollar accident occur? How often 
would a million dollar accident occur, and so forth? Another 
representation of the risks, which is a better representation 
for decision-making purposes, is the national annual risk profile 
which doesn't look at specific events, but instead gives the 
range of loss due to carbon fibers for the nation as a whole. 
This risk representation incorporates the assumption that there 
may be 1, 2, 3 or more accidents. 
Before showing results, however, I want to review the 
assumptions that enter into this calculation. There are five 
major assumptions that should be mentioned. These five are 
shown in figure 26. First, if an aircraft carries composites, we 
assume that the composite will always be involved in the fire. 
In fact, this assumption is not necessarily true and the airframe 
manufacturers are currently investigating the actual probability 
of the fiber being involved in the fire and thus being released. 
MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS 
1. IF AN AIRCRAFT CARRIES COMPOSITE, AND A FIRE 
OCCURS, THE COMPOSITE WILL ALWAYS BE INVOLVED 
2. ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS REMAIN CONSTANT DURING 
DISPERSION OF THE CARBON FIBER CLOUD 
3. FOR A GIVEN FACILITY CATEGORY, ALL FACILITIES ARE 
EQUAL IN SIZE, EQUIPMENT INVENTORY, AND FINANCIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
4. FAILURES OCCUR IMMEDIATELY AFTER EXPOSURE, WITH 
INDEPENDENCE AMONG UNITS OF EQUIPMENT 
5. SECOND-ORDER IMPACTS OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE ARE NOT 
INCLUDED IN ECONOMIC LOSS (e.g. interruption of telephone service) 
Figure 26 
The second assumption is that atmospheric conditions remain 
constant during the dispersion of the carbon fiber cloud. 
However, a cloud traveling 50 miles at a speed of about 2 miles 
per hour can take a day or so and, obviously, the atmospheric 
conditions are going to change. Therefore, this assumption will 
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clearly not hold in practice. Nonetheless, since all the 
different atmospheric conditions will occur with the appropriate 
frequencies, simulation over a large number of accidents should 
yield a risk profile that gives a good indication of the poten- 
tial economic losses. 
The third assumption is that, for a given facility category, 
all facilities are identical in the sense that they have the same 
revenue, the same size of operation, and the same types of equip- 
ment in the plant. In reality we know that there is a wide range 
of facilities; in his presentation, Mr. Ansel Butterfield demon- 
strated some of the variation that can occur. However, we assumed 
an average type of facility for the purpose of calculating economic 
loss. The fourth assumption is that failures occur immediately 
after an accident and that the failure of different units is inde- 
pendent. Although Mr. Israel Taback discussed the issue of possi- 
ble post-exposure vulnerability, we assumed that, if electronic 
equipment is vulnerable, then the failure will occur immediately 
after the accident. The independence assumption means that we 
don't take into account the locations of units within a facility. 
If the units are located close to one another, then their failures 
may somehow be correlated. The fifth assumption, which is an 
important one, concerns the types of losses considered in this 
analysis. We considered only that we called primary losses, 
namely those that were a direct outcome of the incident, 
resulting either in equipment repair costs or in business 
interruption costs. We did not consider the potential secondary 
impacts, such as the losses incurred by the interruption of 
telephone service to a community. In the case of an airport, 
for example, we did not consider the potential costs of clean-up 
or decontamination following a carbon fiber exposure. We looked 
only at the costs of potential failures that would occur. 
Figure 27 gives the actual risk profile that was derived. 
The axis on the left shows the annual probability of losses 
exceeding a certain amount. The axis at the bottom shows the 
total losses in dollars. This curve is the risk profile for 
a single year for the nation as a whole. This means that, in 
1993, there is an 80% chance that we will experience losses in 
excess of 10,000 dollars. Further, moving down the curve about 
every ten years we would expect to incur a loss of a million 
dollars or more. Following the curve to the right-hand end, we 
learn that once about every thousand years, one would expect 
losses of the order of ten million dollars or more. We also 
extrapolated the curve further and are in the process of 
sharpening estimates, so that we can examine the possibility of 
higher losses at the very low tail end of the risk profile. 
There may, in fact, be probabilities of the order of 10-d of 
losses exceeding 20 or 30 million dollars. 
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ANNUAL RISK PROFILE FOR 
CARBON FIBER RELEASES FROM COMMERCIAL AIR CARRIERS 
(1993 CF Utilization) 
10.5 I 
104 105 106 10’ 108 
Total Losses X (Dollarr~ 
Figure 27 
Although the curve in figure 27 is an economic loss profile, 
it is possible to develop a risk profile showing the potential 
fatalities due to shock hazards using a very similar procedure. 
The entire methodology that I've described is applicable to that 
case, except that, instead of looking at failures of equipment, 
we would simply look at the probability of a shock hazard for 
each facility that is examined in the exposed area. 
The confidence bounds shown on the profile in figure 27 
are estimates and we are currently sharpening these estimates. 
Although the profile was calculated with 1993 carbon fiber 
utilization figures, it reflects the 1972 census figures and is 
expressed in 1977 dollars, so it's a hybrid risk profile. It. 
shows us what the risk would be in 1977 assuming that the number 
of facilities has remained relatively constant and assuming that 
airplanes today were carrying the kind of fibers that they would 
in 1993. 
We feel that this risk profile is conservative, in the sense 
that it tends to overestimate the risks rather than underestimate 
the risks. There are several reasons for this. One is that in 
most of our release assumptions, we attempted to be on the con- 
servative side. Another is that the building transfer functions 
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used were in every case at the maximum or high end of the range. 
On the other hand, although it's a conservative risk profile, 
secondary losses are not included. It is conceivable that there 
would be additional losses due to some types of impacts, such as 
telephone or airport service interruption, which have not yet 
been quantified, and these inclusions might tend to move the risk 
profile slightly to the right. 
Now, in order to compare our results against risks which 
have been estimated for other types of disasters or accidents, 
let's compare against the curves which Dr. Karen Credeur showed 
previously. These curves, shown in figure 28, are taken from 
the Reactor Safety Study, the Wash 1400 report. Shown are the 
curves corresponding to natural events, man-caused events, and 
nuclear power plants. These curves have different meanings than 
the risk profile that I showed you a moment ago; they are national 
annual loss frequencies. They don't show losses to the US as a 
whole in a given year; instead they show how frequently acci- 
dents occur involving various levels of loss. The axis on the 
left gives the frequency of incidents per year involving dollar 
damages greater than a certain amount, X. For example, $10,000 
is the lowest level of loss shown and, since a log scale is used, 
the plot says that we will have approximately two carbon-fiber 
related accidents per year involving losses of more than $10,000. 
As you move down the curve, you find that the frequency of 
accidents involving losses of greater than a million dollars is 
COMPARISON OF RISK PROFILES 
1 
100 
Nuclear 
POWS 
Plants \ 
-7 
in .- 104 105 106 10’ 108 log .^ 10’” 10 ‘l 
Total LonesX (Dollars) 
Figure 28 
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only one in a hundred. In other words, there's a one hundredth 
chance of an incident each year involving a loss greater than a 
million dollars. 
If you compare the CF curve against the other curves shown 
in figure 28, you find that it falls well to the left of those 
curves, indicating that at the same level of frequency the poten- 
tial losses due to aircraft accident carbon fiber releases are 
significantly lower. For example, at the 10D2 level, in other 
words, the one accident in a hundred, the estimated damages from 
carbon fiber are a million or more, but, in the case of the man- 
caused or natural events, they are considerably more, on the 
order of $1 billion. The same is true of the Reactor Safety 
Study curve for a hundred nuclear power plants. Although there 
isn't much overlap between the ranges of these two curves, where 
there is some overlap we again see that for an equivalent low 
frequency of occurrence, the damage cost is higher for nuclear 
power plants. For example, for the one accident in a thousand, 
the damage from carbon fibers is about ten million dollars, 
whereas an accident involving a nuclear power plant would have 
damage in excess of a billion dollars. 
Figure 29 gives the areas of future effort which will improve 
the risk estimates that I've shown. These estimates must be con- 
sidered preliminary due to some of the assumptions that have been 
AREAS OF FUTURE EFFORT 
1. REFINEMENT OF RELEASE AND DISPERSION ANALYSIS 
2. DETAILED ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR SPECIFIC BUSINESS CATEGORIES 
3. PROJECTING IMPACTS OF GROWTH IN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 
4. DETERMINATION OF CONFIDENCE BOUNDS FOR RISK PROFILE 
5. PERFORM ANALYSIS OF WORST CASE SCENARIO 
6. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS AT AIRPORTS 
Figure 29 
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made. However, there are a number of areas that will assist us in 
refining the estimates. Note that the expected annual loss on the 
risk profile is $419,000 for the nation as a whole due to any 
accidents that might release carbon fibers. The standard devia- 
tion of that risk profile is $785,000. This large deviation 
shows a fairly wide variati,on, and,for this reason, we need a 
risk profile to examine the possible range of damage that might 
result. 
In the areas of possible future effort, the refinement of 
the release and dispersion analysis is important, particularly 
with respect to the release conditions at the time of the 
accident. In addition, the economic analysis for business 
categories could be improved by examining specific industries 
more carefully and by looking at the variation within industries. 
The impacts of growth in the electronic industry should be 
accounted for so that we can have a better feeling for what the 
potentially vulnerable equipment will look like in 1993. 
The confidence bound shown on the risk profile can be 
improved through sensitivity analysis and we're currently in the 
process of doing that. The sensitivity analysis examines the 
effect of the uncertainty in each of the variables which enter 
into the risk profile calculation. We are also in the process 
of analyzing the worst case scenario. It is possible that there 
are extremely costly accidents with extremely small probabilities, 
but which are still realistic and might occur. We will identify 
the potential worst case which may, in fact, exceed the current 
value that we estimate for the maximum loss due to any one 
accident, which is about 10 million dollars. In fact, we may 
identify accidents which potentially could cause a greater loss, 
perhaps 20 million dollars or more. Finally, the economic 
analysis at the airports needs to be improved. In particular, 
the cost of prevention and decontamination, and the question of 
the potential failure of airplanes after exposure are still open 
issues. That concludes our presentation. 
QUESTIONS 
Question: Question related to (1) differences in the OR1 
and A. D. Little risk analysis and (2) the sensitivity of 
the estimates to the amount of fiber released. 
Response: With respect to the differences between our 
estimates, there is some uncertainty, and different methods 
were used. We feel that our estimate is an accurate reflection 
of a conservative risk profile. There are confidence bounds 
on our estimate and I think it's possible that the results 
shown by the other organization will fall within those 
confidence bounds. With respect to the second question, the 
purpose of the sensitivity analysis is to identify the possible 
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variations in risks that might be due to uncertainty in the 
variables of interest, for example, the percentage of fibers 
released. This is still a question, and it is being 
investigated. We are attempting to see what the effect 
would be on a risk profile of varying the inputs. You can 
assume a 20% fiber release or you can assume a 1% release; 
the question is: What is the impact upon the total risk? 
As Dr. Kalelkar mentioned earlier, even with substantial 
uncertainty bounds, the risk profile still allows you to say 
something about the risks. It still may allow decisions by 
the appropriate decision makers regarding the risks. 
Comment: . . . the risk analysis says the problem falls 
somewhere between no problem and a major problem. 
Response: I don't think we ever said that there was a major 
problem. We're showing that with some probability you could 
do a million dollars worth of damage. As to whether that's 
a problem that we should be concerned about or not, we haven't 
judged. 
Response by Israel Taback: I thought the point of the comment 
was that one of the computations indicated no problem, and 
the other one did indicate somewhat of a problem. Actually, I'm 
surprised that the two answers are so close. If you take the 
OR1 Washington statistics and multiply by the ratio of oper- 
ations in the nation to those in Washington, and then multiply 
by 10, the difference between 1985 and 1993, the expected val- 
ues per year come out to be about the same as the ADL number. 
Question: Which of the variables which enter into the risks 
has the greatest effect upon the risks? 
Response: We are currently investigating that in a sensitivity 
analysis and in our final report we will try to indicate 
which of the variables has the greatest impact. It's a little 
early to say at this point, but you got some indications 
from what was shown. For example, the transfer functions vary 
over 3 to 4 orders of magnitude. As we've indicated, we've 
always used the highest transfer function in the spirit of 
trying to be conservative, and get an overestimate initially 
rather then an underestimate. So that is one area which can 
influence it. The other is that economic analysis was done 
in a relatively straightforward manner and requires substantial 
additional work. The actual losses that might be encountered 
could be quite different. 
We have done some sensitivity analyses on the transfer function, 
and it turns out that if you go down to the minimum of the 
range, the expected value of the risk is diminished by about 
80%. 
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Question: I realize for purpose of the analysis that it is 
necessary to assume as you did, (1) all failures occur 
immediately, and (2) you can't start out by trying to assess 
the cost of the secondary failure downstream, such as the 
cost of being without telephone service or computer service. 
Yet it seems to me a very real possibility that several hours 
after the accident or even a day after the accident the 
redistribution is a very significant problem. You may have a 
small immediate cost of 10,000 dollars whereas the secondary 
down the line costs might be millions. Is somebody pursuing 
that type of analysis to see how severe those problems can 
be? 
Response: Yes, we intend to give that additional thought. 
We just haven't had a chance to do it all yet. We are pursuing 
that. 
Question: On your third curve from the last, that showed the 
possible dollar value of each incident, you showed a rather large 
spread from each of the points. I notice you took the zero 
as your starting point and for your first spread you went 
very near the top of the spread and for the second spread 
you were at the middle. If you had redrawn that curve so 
you would cross those spreads towards the center of both you 
would come out more with a straight line so that the future 
accidents could have amounted to somewhat higher levels of 
money, instead of one times ten to the sixth perhaps closer 
to ten to the seventh or eighth. I was just curious why you 
chose to draw more a downward pointing curve rather than 
more of a straight line? 
Response: Well, there are two parts to that answer. If 
you're talking about the risk profile itself, you realize 
that on the left-hand side, it can never go above one. So, 
there is a constraining factor there. Then, as Dr. Karen 
Credeur pointed out, there is a different amount of conservatism 
applied to different portions of the curve. So sometimes we 
might have an estimate that could err larger in the upside 
risk if you will, than in the downside risk, and sometimes 
the other way around. They don't have to be centrally 
located in respect to their actual value as shown. It is 
properly adjusted for that and the curve you saw was our 
best estimate of the risk. 
Question: Question related to the effect of the size of the 
carbon fibers. 
Response: In actuality, fiber size makes some difference in 
the amount of damage that can occur, the way they disperse, 
and so on. In this analysis, we assumed that they were 
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between 7 and 10 millimeters long. 
Another open area which I guess we neglected to mention is 
the fact that we were dealing really with dispersion of sin- 
gle fibers. It was pointed out in previous presentations 
that you can have lint or clumps; this has not been looked 
at. 
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